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Gift Giving and Corruption 
Abstract 
When individuals exchange gifts social bonds are strengthened and reciprocity is created. 
If the gift and the reciprocation both come from private resources it is clearly a gift. If what 
is reciprocated after a gift is given comes from an organization, or is a government resource 
rather than from “one’s own pocket” then it is most likely a bribe.  The key variable is not 
the value of the gift but the transparency of the transaction.  What has occurred is the 
trading of entrusted authority.  This is corruption, and a serious danger to public policy. 
This study reviews anthropological literature on gift giving, and constructs a typology for 
the examining the gift/ bribe distinction in public administration. This classification helps 
to distinguish analytically among different types of gift practice and clarify conceptual 
ambiguity of the terms gift and bribe. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Public administration involves the implementation of policies and the use of discretion in 
that implementation.  Gift giving is a universal phenomenon. When gifts are given in a 
social situation what is expected in return?  When gifts are given in a public sector activity 
what is expected in return?  When is a gift a bribe?  These are the questions that this study 
seeks to address.  In so doing it explores the literature around gift giving, and applies it to a 
public administration context. 
 
 
The Weberian concept of bureaucracy places the office at the heart of legal-rational activity. 
Civil servants occupy an office and perform duties commensurate with that office.  There 
are delegations attached to each office, and civil servants receive a salary for exercising 
these delegations. They should receive no more than their salary. In some countries salaries 
for civil servants are so low that the proceeds of bribery and extortion supplement the 
meager wages.  In developed countries many civil servants’ salaries are comparatively low, 
and the judgments they make create wealth and opportunity for stakeholders who generally 
have more than the civil servants with whom they deal. The low paid civil servants 
however can exercise considerable discretion which can provide opportunity for bribe 
taking or extortion. 
 
 
When civil servants control scarce resources such as the issuing of a licence, which they 
might not issue without a bribe, we have a situation of rent seeking. They have or they 
create a monopoly.  Seeking a bribe in addition to their salary does not add value, nor add to 
productivity.  Speed money, by which civil servants speed up a process has often led 
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government officials to extort payments for the provision of any service at all.  This rent 
seeking behaviour, then becomes the standard for required payments, and this leads to 
significant inefficiencies (Klitgaard 1998, 41), not to mention the undermining of 
confidence.  Rent seeking is not the focus of this paper. 
 
 
Under Weber’s rational legal system all officials follow rules and fit into formal roles that 
are separate from the personal, family and friendship roles that shape the society. They are 
supposed to treat each client impartially and equally, ignoring social issues and personal 
ties.  As Felson (2011) points out, in Weber’s terms bureaucracy is like a machine, since it 
separates personal interests (including family and friend commitments) from larger interests, 
and facilitates the latter. 
 
 
All social systems involve looking after one’s personal interests and meeting social 
commitments to relatives and friends.  Felson (2011) further notes that corruption is the 
interplay between these primary human imperatives and the imperatives of the bureaucratic 
systems that channel human interests.  A tension therefore is apparent between human 
activities and aspirations and the imperatives of the larger social and economic system.  This 
is played out at the margins of what might be deemed corruption in bureaucracies, and the 
lubricant is often the gifts that are exchanged, and the nature of those exchanges. 
 
 
Generally people see no harm in the giving of gifts.  Gifts are usually exchanged as part of a 
regular social relationship.  On the other hand people almost universally condemn bribes, 
viewing them as undesirable, harmful and destructive. Bribes are given to influence the 
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outcome of a political, bureaucratic, business or professional decision or relationship. Gifts 
are legal, while bribes are illegal.  If only it were so clear cut and unambiguous! 
 
 
This paper examines gift giving in public life and notes that while the line between a gift 
and a bribe is contestable, acceptance of and reliance on gifts harms public policy and the 
delivery of services.  Let us list a dozen examples from our research.  The first and last 
examples are clear cut and unambiguously a gift and a bribe respectively.  Each of the 
examples in between would have advocates arguing about the extent they are acceptable or 
unacceptable behaviours, and how they affect an outcome. The first few examples are clear 
social and private examples, the later group are examples of public policy and public 
service. 
 
 
1. A neighbor in America brings a new resident to the neighborhood home baked cakes 
and cookies and a casserole. 
2. In Japan new business partners often exchange beautifully wrapped quality gifts at 
the end of their first meeting. 
3. An employee electrician in Poland installs an alarm and surveillance system in his 
daughter’s kindergarten for free (in work time, and using his employer’s equipment). 
4. A multinational company in Europe rents out two elegant resorts, a ski house in 
Austria and a seaside villa in Croatia. The company gives its VIP suppliers and 
clients in different countries the opportunity to spend some time in the resorts for 
free whenever they want. 
5. An employee motor mechanic in Hungary works on a car that has been brought in 
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for service and fixes (without charge) on his friend's car, things over and above what 
is being paid for. 
6. In many post-socialist Central and Eastern European countries people give unofficial 
payments in white envelopes to doctors to show their “gratitude” (otherwise they 
may not be attended to). 
7. Before a wedding Kazakh families organize ‘in-law parties’ in which they invite a 
powerful government official who receives expensive gifts from the parents of the 
couple 
8. A city official in New Zealand who is responsible for approving construction permits 
is taken to a lavish lunch by a property developer, and then to a football match where 
he sits in a corporate box. 
9. By giving small gifts, citizens in Benin try to ‘personalize’ their relationship with 
government officers otherwise they face negligent or harsh treatment. 
10. In rural Mexico corrupt government officials share some of their illegally 
accumulated wealth throughout the local community by financing carnivals and 
fiestas with free food and alcohol. 
11. A government minister for public works in Queensland Australia accepts heavily 
discounted shares in a mining company, which is planning a new mine and other 
infrastructure investments. 
12. A driving license tester in India is offered money to issue a driver’s license without 
the applicant taking a test. 
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These examples can be discussed and debated to identify social exchanges, bribes, rent 
seeking, and various arrangements that could distort policy and services.  Noting the 
conceptual ambiguity of the terms gift and bribe, this paper is divided into three parts.  The 
first part provides a working definition of gift giving and discusses several forms of goods 
that can be exchanged as a gift, and discusses similarities between gifts and bribes.  We 
show that many informal practices that are defined legally as bribes have the same context 
and characteristics as do gifts. In the second part, we note that when transactions take place 
in organisations a distinction is made between normal gift giving and bribery.  In the third 
part we construct a framework for the analysis of gifts and bribes in the public sector.  We 
conclude with applications of the framework and suggestions for future studies. 
 
 
Lines are often rigidly drawn.  Bribery or corruption is typically associated with immorality 
and evil, and gift giving is linked to goodness and self-sacrifice (Rose-Ackerman 1998). 
Economists, legal scholars, political scientists and international NGOs categorically take the 
view that bribes are illegal acts, prohibited by law, and understood as such in many 
societies.  However, this approach falls short of explaining why otherwise normal 
individuals all around the world routinely break the rules and engage in informal exchanges 
that are defined as bribery by law.  Answers can be found in the work of anthropologists, 
who provide the most comprehensive scholarship on this topic, and the task is to apply these 
to public administration. 
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Anthropological Concepts of Gift and Bribe 
 
 
What is Gift Giving? 
 
Rather than crisply defining “gift” anthropologists consider gift giving and bribing as 
“emic” concepts that should not be defined by the observer scientist but rather ought to be 
examined from the perspective of local people (Torsello and Venard 2015).  Gift and bribe 
are what local actors believe that they are (Werner 2002).  Instead of defining the gift/ bribe 
divide strictly in legal terms, scholars in anthropology introduce a second dimension and 
discuss the topic in terms of law and morality at the same time (Anders and Nuijten 2008). 
According to this view, what is defined as corrupt and illegal by the authorities, is often 
regarded as gift giving, a morally justifiable act by local population (Torsello and Venard 
2015).  The legal system should not be the primary standard against which practices are 
judged as either gift giving or bribes (Smart and Hsu 2008). 
 
 
According to the Encyclopædia Britannica, “gift exchange is the transfer of goods or 
services that, although regarded as voluntary by the people involved, is part of the expected 
social behavior.” This views gift as an exchange process that transfers resources between 
actors. Exchange means "the giving up of something in return for receiving something else” 
(Macneil 1986).  The definition also suggests that gift is subject to social expectations 
(rules), even if the participants are not aware. 
 
 
Almost anything of value can be given as a gift. Nevertheless, gift does not need to be an 
object with physical properties (Larsen and Watson 2001).  It may come in different forms 
of labor; for example, cooking for someone (Carrier 1991; Murcott 1983).  Mutual favors 
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(including sex) can also serve as a gift.  Nonmaterial gifts or counter gifts do not always 
come from an individual.  They can be initiated by a community or family, in the form of 
symbolic capital such as recognition, honor, prestige, or nobility (Bourdieu 1997). For 
example, unconditional hospitality to total strangers was the norm in Arab, Iranian and 
Indian cultures where the indirect reciprocity came as credit from the community (Offer 
1997). 
 
 
Anthropologists originally studied gift in ancient or “primitive” cultures, but they also 
confirm that gift giving is a fundamental informal institution in contemporary societies 
(Lemmergaard and Muhr 2011).  Beyond the typical and pure gift situations such as 
birthday, wedding or Christmas gifts, our modern social life is full of symbolic and 
materialistic exchanges of favors.  For example, when our neighbors are busy we pick up 
their children from school , and in return, they walk our dog when we have to work late. 
Gifts have a clear complementary role in areas where market solutions are scarce or 
imperfect. There are obvious instrumental benefits of such informal quid pro quo because 
we can obtain resources that are rare or more expensive if purchased in a commercial 
market.  Through gift-type exchanges, we can also receive services that require more trust 
between the partners than impersonal economic transactions normally offer. 
 
 
Similarities Between Gifts and Bribes 
 
Gifts and bribes are both socially functional institutions, and operate as complex rule 
systems.  According to anthropologists both gifts and bribes are informal exchange 
processes regulated by multiple (formal and informal) rule systems (Anders and Nuijten 
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2008).  Beyond their instrumental advantages, both have important social functions which 
keep together social groups at different levels of society.  The universal norms of gift giving 
and bribery (1) trigger reciprocity, (2) regulate the (gift/bribe) exchange process, and (3) 
enforce a quid pro quo.  According to anthropologists this normative similarity suggests that 
gift and bribe constitute the same type of social behaviour (Smart and Hsu 2008; Shore and 
Haller 2005). 
 
 
Gift and Bribe as Multiple Rule Systems.  Simmel (1950, 387) claims that “all contacts 
among men rest on the schema of giving and returning the equivalence.” The most 
powerful driver of gift exchanges is reciprocity, a universal norm that can be found in 
almost all cultures. The origin of the universal norm of reciprocity can be tracked back to 
ancient religious rituals, when people offered sacrifices to the gods as an act that should 
have been necessarily reciprocated (Mauss 2002, 20-21). Forms of reciprocity exist in all 
societies to this day. 
 
 
Although the economics literature claims that altruistic giving exists when giving is not 
followed by a return from the recipient (Rose- Ackerman 1998), anthropologists believe that 
gifts always trigger a return or at minimum, a feeling of obligation to repay favors on the 
receiver side (Douglas 2002). The unreciprocated gift makes the person who has accepted it 
feel inferior because of the sense of indebtedness and the receiver will seek to get rid of such 
obligation by reciprocating (Malinowski 1922; Mauss 2002, 83; Strathern 2012; Ferraro 
2004).  Reciprocity means lending resources to someone in the present and demanding (or 
at least hoping for) a return in the future (Peebles 2010). 
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Beyond the strong obligation to reciprocate, informal norms also shape other parts in the 
exchange of giving and accepting gifts (Mauss 2002, 17). Some gifts are regulated by 
society wide, almost universalistic norms.  For example, Christmas, birthday or baby shower 
gifts and the related informal codes can be found in most countries. Some gift-related 
norms are more culture specific.  In many Latin American countries, giving a knife as a gift 
is taboo because it means ending a relationship (Arunthanes et al. 1994).  In China, giving a 
clock as a gift is associated with bad luck (Reardon 1984). 
 
 
Anthropologists argue that the phenomenon defined as bribery by authorities is regulated by 
informal rules simultaneously with formal criminal codes.  Such legal plurality makes the 
boundaries between gift and bribe especially blurry (Polese 2008). From this 
anthropological view, gift and bribe refer to the same type of social behavior because both 
are subject of diverse and often contradictory rule systems, and formal law is just one of 
them.  Informal norms are often so powerful indicating that people should share limited 
resources in a particular way, very often with their closest friends, kin, classmates, 
colleagues, ethnic groups, local communities or other informal networks, and not with 
outsiders, as we saw in example 5 (the Hungarian motor mechanic). 
 
 
Universal informal norms can facilitate bribery. For example, it was a common aphorism in 
many socialist countries the “those who do not steal from the state steal from their families” 
(Misangyi et al. 2008).  Such general “Robin Hood” attitudes still exist in the post- 
communist period and makes ‘stealing back’ from the state perfectly legitimate or even 
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obligatory for major part of society (Jancsics 2015).  Furthermore paying physicians 
unofficially in post-communist Russia or Hungary is not just morally accepted but an almost 
obligatory universal norm (Rivkin-Fish 2005; Gaál 2006).  Despite this practice being 
illegal in both countries, those who do not express such appreciation could expect a lower 
quality physician service.  In Kazakhstan officials only accept bribes from people they 
know, and the handing over a secret envelope is stated as  “this is for your children”. 
(Werner 2000). 
 
 
Gift and Bribe as Socially Functional Institutions.  Gift and bribe both have important 
social functions as we discuss below when describing compadrazgo, blat, and guanxi. They 
keep social groups together and help them survive by reducing risk and uncertainty derived 
from inadequate formal institutional structures.  A gift represents something substantially 
social beyond its pure instrumental value (Alexander 2001; Carrier 1991). 
 
 
A gift always refers to its symbolic meaning related to the social bond between the partners 
and the giver’s self-identity (Sherry 1983; Betteridge   1985) and as rituals, gifts shape the 
participants’ recent and future expectations and behavior (Komter 2007). Thus gift has a 
crucial communicative function (Schieffelin 1980).  It sends symbolic messages from the 
giver, which are interpreted by the receiver (Wooten 2000). Gifts can be strategically used 
as signals of the intention to establish relationship and shorten social distance (Camerer 
1988; Otnes and Beltramini 1996; Sahlins 1965). For example, giving home baked cakes 
and cookies to new neighbors, a widespread custom in US suburbs, is one way to make the 
newcomers members of the local community. Signalling that a gift is required for the issue 
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of a licence however, is rent seeking.  While this is a distortion of public policy this 
phenomenon is not the main theme of this paper. 
 
 
When applied to a bureaucratic situation, ingroup and outgroup operate differently.  Corrupt 
exchanges within a bureaucracy are risky, if trust is not strong. Trust is a typical solution 
for risk because it provides a framework of social arrangements by serving as a buffer 
against uncertainty (Luhman 1988, 95). There is the functional aspect of the gift-briber 
dilemma. Transactions that look like deviant and socially harmful behavior to outside 
observers might be seen as a gift practice with crucial social and symbolic functions by the 
local population (Smith 2007, 10).  Trust-based informal exchange systems that are often 
labeled as corrupt by outside observers or authorities often function as survival kits to deal 
with the inadequacies of formal institutional structures, shortage, insufficient formal rights, 
harsh uncertain environment, or rigid authoritarian systems. 
 
 
They exist in many countries but probably the most well known examples are compadrazgo 
in Latin America, blat in Russia, and guanxi in China (Lomnitz 1988).  All of them are 
based on delayed reciprocity. Although some scholars link these systems to corruption, the 
anthropological literature stresses their positive role in compensating for the imperfections 
of government and other formal institutions. 
 
 
In Latin America, the relationship known as ‘compadrazgo’ (co-parent or godparent) has 
become a tool that allows poor social groups to survive physically and lets middle and upper 
classes maintain their social status and privileges (Lomnitz 1988). For example, using 
13 
 
 
compadrazgo, individuals in the urban middle class in Chile circulate resources such as 
political support, school admission, jobs and bank loans (Lomnitz and Sheinbaum 2004). 
Blat was an informal tool in Russia that helped reduce uncertainty in conditions of shortage 
during communist rule (Ledeneva 1998). Russian people used blat as a special form of 
barter, a non-monetary exchange, because in the socialist planned economy money was not 
necessarily the main tool of economic transactions. 
 
 
The continuous reciprocal exchange system in China is known as guanxi.  Its positive 
function is that it builds trust in the absence of adequate formal legal and financial 
institutions (Smart and Hsu 2008). In order to reduce uncertainties in a fraught bureaucratic 
and legal and entrepreneurial system, Chinese people often use gift-based guanxi 
‘friendship’ to obtain licenses, cheap loans, retail space or introduce potential clients. 
Similar systems operate in other cultures. 
 
 
 
Not all bribery is gift related.  Sometimes bribery is a more instrumental transaction with the 
primary function being to obtain direct and one-time benefit for the participants.  The most 
typical examples of such non-gift-type corrupt transactions are bribing traffic police, 
parking attendants, custom officers, or other street-level bureaucrats.  They usually happen 
“on the spot” when the actors do not know each other and there is a little chance that they 
will meet again in the future (Jancsics 2013). Here cash-bribe and instant responses 
dominate the transaction.  They are less personal and more economic-type exchanges when 
parties have distinct economic and social interest (Sahlins 1965, 148; Gregory 1982, 42). 
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Since informal norms rarely provide guidelines, actors are on their own during these 
exchanges.  They must improvise and communicate effectively in order to successfully 
make a corrupt deal on the spot.  However, if the actors are interested in repeating a corrupt 
deal with the same partner, they will likely to turn their exchange into a gift-type bribe 
based on mutual trust and delayed reciprocity, features that reduce the risks of detection and 
blur the corrupt nature of the exchange (Lawler and Hipp 2010). 
 
 
Organizational Dimension 
 
People exchange gifts in various social and familial and clan arrangements as discussed 
above. When we turn to corruption, we can identify corrupt individuals, corrupt groups and 
corrupt organisations (Graycar and Prenzler 2013, 15-17). When gifts are exchanged in a 
way that affects public policy or public administration we need to focus on an organisational 
dimension. At least one corrupt actor is invariably an occupant of a public or private office. 
Corruption and bribery are acts that often involve public servants (Friedrich 1993; Rose- 
Ackerman 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; World Bank 1997), though corruption can be 
found in any formally organized context in governments and in private firms or in NGOs 
(Aguilera and Vadera 2008; Argandona 2003; Ashforth and Anand 2003; Pellegrini 2011: 
19). 
 
 
Social/Organisational Exchanges 
 
Including the organizational dimension in the analysis of the gift-bribe dilemma helps 
distinguish between seemingly similar activities.  A society-to-society transaction involves 
gifts where the organizational affiliation of the partners is irrelevant.  The giver who 
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initiates the transaction, and the receiver who later reciprocates, bring their own or their 
social groups’ resources in the transaction.  When a new resident moves into a 
neighbourhood and a neighbor brings them home baked cakes, and the new resident in 
return invites the neighbour for a lunch it is a typical case of a society-to-society gift 
transaction. 
 
 
In contrast to this pattern, where there is a society-to-bureaucracy transaction, someone 
gives a gift to an organisational member but the counter gift “does not come from one’s 
own pocket” (Ledeneva 2014), but from public or private organizational resources, then 
there is a bribe.  For example, if a government official in Kazakhstan receives an expensive 
gift at an ‘in-law party’ it may not be seen culturally as a bribe, although it may be against 
the code of conduct of his organization (Werner 2000).  However if a few months later he 
reciprocates this gift to the family with, say, a governmental license he will turn 
organizational resources into private ones. He will be trading his entrusted authority. 
 
 
The employee electrician who installs an alarm and surveillance system in his daughter’s 
kindergarten for free in work time, and using his employer’s resources also falls into 
society-to-bureaucracy category.  This is “corruption with theft” (Shleifer and Vishny 
1993), an exchange when the actors steal the goods of their organization and, by following 
the informal norms of their social group, turn them into gifts and transfer them to informal 
group members. 
 
 
The value of the exchange is not always material, and as such where there is low value 
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people often do not perceive it as a bribe.  An employee hairdresser might spend more time 
on a friends’ hair than normally; a car mechanic may fix some extra issues on a neighbour’s 
car and not include them on the bill; a school teacher who is a patient may receive special 
care from a heart specialist whose child is a student in the teacher’s class (Patico 2002). 
 
 
However in many cases the stakes can be much higher (Graycar and Prenzler 2013, 4).  For 
example, giving a license to somebody without the necessary skills to use equipment could 
cause serious accidents and harm people. Regardless of the value of the exchanged gift, 
these practices channel organizational (or public) resources into private hands (Rose- 
Ackerman 1998, 303). 
 
 
Sometimes the counter transfer is not a ‘stolen’ organizational resource but just the normal 
treatment of a client.  In many African countries, people who want to deal with public 
agencies must initiate a personal relation and build trust with civil servants by giving gifts in 
advance of the official transaction (Blundo and Sardan 2006, 32-33). Clients of the public 
service who do not establish such social bonds can expect poorer treatment from the 
officials. 
 
 
Informal exchange systems such as compadrazgo, blat, or guanxi simultaneously transfer 
private/community as well as organizational resources. For example, when guanxi partners 
provide informal loans to each other, the transaction involves only their private resources 
while in many other cases bureaucratic permits and licenses serve as counter gift from a 
guanxi network member. 
17 
 
 
 
 
Gift giving in the organisational circumstances described above can result in a loss in 
revenue and an undermining of bureaucratic processes and confidence in those processes. 
Organisational affiliation is important.  Where it is irrelevant to the transaction, the 
exchange is a gift.  Where one’s affiliation is central to the transaction, the gift may well be 
a bribe. 
 
 
Benign? Gifts and Bribes 
 
In the case of normal gift exchange participants bring their own, family or community 
resources, in the transaction.  When they exchange something that belongs to an 
organization, normal gift exchange becomes a bribe, unless there are clear guidelines and 
transparency.  There are times when a ‘bureaucratic bribe’ is against the organization’s 
formal rules, yet supported by informal organizational expectations. 
 
 
Giving and accepting of gifts and hospitality has an essential role in facilitating long-term 
business relationships. It enhances the company’s image   and increases the chances of sales 
and business deals (Arunthanes et al. 1994).  Moreover, the total denial of corporate gift 
exchange may be well be an insult in many parts of the world.  In Japan, not giving a new 
business partner wrapped quality gifts at the end of their first meeting may prevent future 
deals.  Gift giving can also be an integral part of an organisation’s marketing and 
communication strategy.  A nice pen with the firm’s name on it can remind former or 
current business partners of the firm’s products (Fan 2006). 
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Exchanging bureaucratic gifts has the same functions as gift giving between relatives, 
friends or acquaintances.  It sends symbolic messages, creates goodwill, develops social 
bonds and reduces transaction costs, risks and uncertainties, derived from dealing with 
strangers (Gordon and Miyake 2001).  Importantly, business gifts also have reciprocal 
effects and just like regular gifts they build social cohesion by simulating the informal 
institution of gift within a controlled formal environment (Arunthanes et al. 1994). They aim 
to trigger positive discrimination by the other party to get a discount, a lower price, longer 
delay in payment and so on. 
 
 
Bureaucratic gift giving is regulated by organizational codes of conduct which provide 
guidelines about the form, the value and other conditions of the accepted gifts (Irwin 2013). 
For example, giving or receiving gifts before a large deal or during a tendering process is 
prohibited.  Organizations usually limit the maximum value of the given or received gift and 
require official records about gift transactions.  Nevertheless, most codes offer some 
discretionary freedom to the employees to judge what is acceptable within cultural 
considerations (Gordon and Miyake 2001). 
 
 
The key here is transparency, and an assessment of whether there is an expected and 
distorting quid pro quo for something like a cup of coffee, a meal, or a pen, or some larger 
gift. 
 
 
Bribery as Policy 
 
We cross into different territory when organisational resources are traded for gifts or 
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benefits, and when this is done in secret or with no transparency.  Sometimes this can be 
formal policy in an organisation, sometimes it can be informal practice when the policy 
forbids it. 
 
 
Gift and bribe reallocate organizational resources in order to serve organizations goal, 
enhance business and guarantee the organizations’ survival for a long term. Pharmaceutical 
companies for example sponsor for physicians, all-expenses-paid “conference trips” to 
attractive resort. These practices it is argued significantly increase the prescribing of the 
promoted drugs (Orlowski and Wateska 1992).  A company that maintains ski lodges and 
seaside villas for VIP suppliers and clients, or a property developer who invites officials 
responsible for approving construction, to a lavish lunch follow the very similar pattern. 
 
 
Facilitation payments involve gifts to officials to make happen things that should happen as 
a matter of administrative or bureaucratic course.  Without such a payment an enterprise 
may face serious difficulties in securing normal business activity.  A company's product 
might lie on the dock of a foreign port, and to avoid spoilage of the whole cargo the 
manager makes a choice between a large company loss or a small payment/ gift to facilitate 
the business at hand (Fadiman 1986).  Does it happen just once, or is it endemic?  Such 
settings easily trigger a bureaucratic bribe. These patterns involve gifts in which group of 
employees carry out corrupt action on behalf of the organization (Pinto et al. 2008). 
 
 
Between 2001 and 2007, Siemens, the German multinational with a wide range of 
businesses across the globe, made some 4,283 corrupt payments to foreign officials totalling 
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over $US 1.4 billion.  Up until 1999 in Germany corrupt payments to foreign officials were 
tax-deductible expenses. This led to the systematic embedding of a bribery culture within 
the organization, which included management instructions on how to set up shell companies 
in order to funnel illicit payments to foreign officials.  As a corrupt organization Siemens 
was indicted and prosecuted in Germany, the USA and Italy.1 Overall their breaches of 
procurement policies cost the company $2.6 billion – $1.6 billion in fines in Germany and 
the USA, and $1 billion in self-initiated corporate reforms. 
 
 
Crossing the line between bureaucratic gift and bribe is often authorized by managers 
(Misangyi et al. 2008).  Here the formal organizational rule bans the exchange while 
informal norms legitimated by authorities allow it.  Managers usually do not directly permit 
rule breaking but create a permissive ethical climate and organizational culture (Martin et al. 
2013). Setting up unrealistic service and financial  targets and turning a blind eye to the 
tools employees use to make deals is a typical means of facilitating bureaucratic bribe 
(Ashforth and Anand 2003; Vaughan 1992).  Emphasis on ends rather than means, 
supported by strong incentives for attaining may be a clear signal of an unethical climate 
(Misangyi et al 2008; Brief et al. 2001).  When bribery is an unofficial organizational 
policy, the practice may become routinized and embedded into the organization’s normal 
procedures.  An organization’s informal norm system helps to hide such practices. 
Organizations have a natural tendency to create a culture of silence and cover-up against the 
outside world where even honest members show solidarity with their deviant and corrupt 
colleagues (Katz 1977). 
 
 
 
1 See http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/tag/siemens?currentPage=8 
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Gifts and Bribes in Public Sector Settings 
 
 
We have a situation where people have always exchanged gifts, and incurred obligations. 
We have a formal rational-legal bureaucratic system where the office is the unit of analysis, 
but the office holder has discretion and accountability and if these are out of balance, a 
corrupt situation exists. We have expectations of transparency in dealings, especially those 
that involve exchanges.  All deplore bribery and corruption, yet we find many examples of 
officials receiving gifts that they thought were perfectly acceptable, and perhaps sometimes 
they were. 
 
 
Our political and administrative history is replete with examples of officials who have taken 
gifts and denied that there was a quid pro quo. We have blatant examples of bribes where a 
rent seeking bureaucrat would not perform a required task without a “gift”.  How do we start 
to draw up the categories of what is acceptable and what is not?  Most bureaucratic systems 
have rules about the value of the gifts that officials can receive, and still there is confusion. 
Most systems have “gift registers” which document gifts received, yet these are often not 
complete, or once completed, rarely scrutinized. 
 
 
As noted above, bribes can take many forms and can do damage of great magnitude.  The 
damage is not always financial.  One study in New York found that the dollar value of 
bribes paid to NYC officials was very small (bribes of less than a few hundred dollars) yet 
the damage was to reputation, confidence, and most of all to the governance capacity of the 
city itself (Graycar and Villa 2011). 
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All of this has relevance for public administration. Officials need to have discretion and 
need to engage with stakeholders.  To refuse a cup of coffee purchased by a stakeholder 
does not make sense, nor does the refusal to accept a sandwich lunch, or a bunch of flowers, 
or a box of chocolates.  Yet so many training courses in organisational integrity focus on 
these types of events and discuss them in great detail.  If an official could be “bought” for a 
cup of coffee, and misuse discretion, then s/he would not benefit from more rules or more 
restrictions.  The real challenge is knowing when to draw the line  - modest lunch, less 
modest dinner, premium box at the football, trip to Las Vegas, with perhaps the services of a 
hooker.  Most officials know where to draw the line. The key is to be open and transparent 
about any gift. 
 
 
In essence we have four situations which we call, social gift, social bribe, bureaucratic 
gift, bureaucratic bribe.  These four categories all involve some element of gift, and 
therefore are distinct from our example 12 above (driving license inspector) which is 
unambiguously a bribe -  a non-gift bribe. Our typology below does not cover the common 
phenomenon of a non-gift bribe. Our other examples are assigned to the various categories, 
though this assignment could be the subject of debate. 
 
 
Table 1 shows these main types of exchanges that involve gift. The variables that we would 
consider for each of these are: what is the primary function of the exchange; what is it that is 
being transacted; what is expected in return; does the organisational affiliation of the 
participants matter; are they exchanging their own resources, or somebody else’s (the 
organisation’s); is there transparency in the transaction; who are the winners and who are 
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the losers; what is the primary means of regulation of the transaction. 
 
 
 
Social gift is an exchange of private resources between individuals or members of a social 
group with the primary function of facilitating (maintaining, creating, negotiating or 
breaking) social relationships and reinforce social bonds.  Here the participants’ formal 
organizational affiliation is irrelevant.  Although social gifting is facilitated by informal 
norms it is a relatively transparent act, visible to other group members and outsiders.  There 
are usually no losers of this type of gift giving.  Example 1 above, fits here. 
 
 
Social bribe is very similar to social gift practices except that here at least one actor brings 
into the transaction goods that belong to an organization.  The primary function of this 
exchange type is still social.  In this case the obligations and informal norms derived from 
one’s social membership are more powerful than the organizational rules and are related to 
the person’s formal bureaucratic role.  Therefore participants view “stealing” from their 
organization as acceptable or even desirable. While the community and individuals benefit 
by strengthening social bonds the organization loses its resources.  Social bribe is not 
transparent, since actors try to hide the exchange from the organization. Examples 3, 5, 6, 7, 
9, 10, fit here. 
 
 
Bureaucratic gift is a transparent and formally regulated gift form that allocates 
organizational resources. It tries to simulate social gifting by creating goodwill and 
triggering reciprocal effects between office holders in different bureaucracies.  The primary 
instrumental function of this type is to benefit the organization by facilitating smoother 
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transactions with other organizations.  However the norm of reciprocity is usually weaker in 
organizational contexts than in society because people often feel that the favor they receive 
is driven by calculative motivation rather than genuine help (Belmi and Pfeffer 2015). 
Example 2 fits here. 
 
 
 
Bureaucratic bribe involves gifts-type transactions in which the main beneficiary, as in the 
case of bureaucratic gift, is the organization. Here formal rule breaking is facilitated by 
informal norms, the organization’s corrupt culture.  Although individuals may also profit 
from a bureaucratic bribe the primary function of such non-transparent transactions is to 
ensure the organization’s survival. Defense contractors who have former senior military 
officers in the top echelons may exhibit bureaucratic bribery, for in winning large contracts 
through their contacts, the organisation wins and the community loses as public spending on 
weapons goes up without real competition (Perrow 2007). Similarly a company which might 
provide a gift to the police retirement foundation could get its security protection from the 
city’s police department on very favourable terms.  Or a company which finances an urban 
renewal project would be so much in favour with the city government which could limit 
development applications by competitors, whose entry could increase the demand for skilled 
labor in the area.  In these examples of bureaucratic bribe, the organisation wins and the 
community loses.. Examples 4, 8, 11 fit here. 
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Table 1. Types of gift exchange 
 
 
Social Gift 
 
 Primary function, social 
 
 Individual or societal transaction 
 
 Private goods exchanged 
 
 Community/ individual benefits by strengthening 
social bonds 
 
 Nobody loses 
 
 Governed by informal norms 
 
 Transparent 
Social Bribe 
 
 Primary function, social 
 
 Individual or societal vs. organizational transaction 
 
 Private and organizational goods exchanged 
 
 Community/ individual benefits by strengthening 
social bonds 
 
 Organization loses 
 
 Governed by informal norms 
 
 Non-transparent 
Bureaucratic Gift 
 
 Primary function, instrumental 
 
 Organizational transaction 
 
 Organizational goods exchanged 
 
 Organization benefits 
 
 Nobody loses 
 
 Governed by formal rules 
 
 Transparent 
Bureaucratic Bribe 
 
 Primary function, instrumental 
 
 Organizational transaction 
 
 Organizational goods exchanged 
 
 Organization benefits 
 
 Competition or general public loses 
 
 Governed by informal organizational norms 
 
 Non-transparent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Gift and bribe practices are similar phenomena that can be found all around the world. 
People have always circulated resources through gift exchanges in order to keep their social 
group together. These trust-based relationship structures help reduce risk and uncertainty 
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and offer safety networks, stability and meaning in many situations of social life. 
Anthropologists reveal shared features and important social and cultural aspects of the gift- 
bribe divide. Gift and bribe are relative; they may look totally differently from the 
perspective of authorities than from the viewpoint of local actors. 
 
 
However there is a tipping point where a normal gift turns into a bribe.  The typology we 
offer here suggests that the organizational dimension is an important explanatory factor in 
the analysis of gift-bribe practices in two ways. It helps clarify the difference between gift 
and bribe. It is also a sufficient tool to detect additional gift-type exchanges that occur only 
between organizational actors. The presence of organizational resources in an informal 
transaction is a distinguishing criterion between gift and bribe. Moreover a bribe is always a 
hidden non-transparent exchange. 
 
 
Sharing bureaucratic resources with favoured outsiders is clearly against the interest of the 
organization and it is likely that organizational control mechanisms will seek and detect 
such ‘leaks.’ However in the case of bureaucratic gift and bribe practices, the organization 
may not detect the transfer as a resource loss. Some organisations turn a blind eye to the 
move from gift to bribe as they view it as an investment in the organization’s future. Other 
organisations build integrity so they can adhere as much as possible to the Weberian 
bureaucratic model and invest in their staff to build integrity and handle gift/ bribe issues in 
an ethical and transparent manner. 
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